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I INTRODUCTION
This essay concerns the following question: can s 39(2) of the South
African Constitution1 be justified by Ronald Dworkin’s notion of
‘political integrity’?
To understand this question one must know what s 39(2) of the South
African Constitution says and what Dworkin’s notion of political
integrity entails. Section 39(2) holds that ‘when developing the common
law . . . every court . . . must promote the spirit, purport and objects of
the Bill of Rights’. Dworkin’s notion of political integrity, most fully
developed in his Law’s Empire,2 can be summarised in four points. First,
political integrity is a property that a community’s legal rules possess to a
smaller or larger degree. Legal rules must here be understood as legal rules
still in force: thus precedents that have not been overruled and statutes
that have not been repealed.3 Secondly, a community’s legal rules possess
political integrity in so far as they are ‘consistent in principle’. The more
consistent in principle the rules are, the more political integrity they
possess, and the converse.4 Thirdly, a community’s rules are consistent in
principle in so far as it is possible to justify them by principles that form a
consistent set. As Dworkin puts it: a community lacks integrity if ‘it must
endorse principles to justify part of what it has done that it must reject to
justify the rest’.5 Fourthly, according to Dworkin, political integrity (in
the sense explained) is a political virtue besides justice and fairness. In
other words, it matters that a community’s legal rules are just and fair (fair
in the sense that they were produced by procedures that distribute power
in the right way). But that is not all that matters. It also matters that the
rules possess political integrity, that the rules are consistent in principle.6
Even one who understands the question that I have posed, namely
whether s 39(2) can be justified on the ground that it promotes the
political integrity of South Africa’s legal rules, may nonetheless be
puzzled that I should be asking it. Why, it may be wondered, should we
look to political integrity in order to justify s 39(2)? After all, as Dworkin
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readily acknowledges, political integrity is not the only political virtue.
Besides political integrity, there are the well-known and widely-accepted
virtues of justice and fairness. Some may be of the view that s 39(2) serves
one or both of these virtues. That is, they may feel that, in so far as a court
develops the South African common law so as to promote the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, it makes South Africa’s legal
rules more just or more fair. Moreover, some may feel that that is a
sufficient justification for s 39(2) and, consequently, that my question has
little practical import.
The following three sections of this essay aim to dispel these doubts
about the importance of the question that I have posed. The sections
show that s 39(2) cannot, in fact, be justified on the basis of either justice
or fairness. In section II, a distinction is drawn between two ways in
which a rule can be used in order to justify a decision, both of which
accord a role to the purpose (or, if you like, the ‘spirit, purport and
objects’) of the rule. I call them ‘concretisation’ and ‘analogical
reasoning’. In section III, I demonstrate that s 39(2) requires private
common law to be developed in the latter rather than the former fashion,
ie, by analogical reasoning rather than by concretisation. Then, in section
IV, I explain that, because s 39(2) requires private common law to be
developed by analogical reasoning rather than concretisation, it cannot
be justified by appeal to justice or fairness.
Sections V and VI of the essay then proceed to investigate whether
political integrity can do what justice and fairness cannot, namely justify
s 39(2). Section V shows why political integrity might appear to offer a
justification. Section VI shows that appearances are deceptive here: it
might be that s 39(2) cannot be justified by appeal to political integrity,
for it might be that s 39(2) does not in fact promote the political integrity
of South Africa’s legal rules.
II PURPOSE, CONCRETISATION, AND ANALOGICAL
REASONING
In this section, I explain the difference between concretisation and
analogical reasoning in the law, and the different role that purpose plays in
each. Much of the explanation is unoriginal. Much of the explanation
will, I hope, be uncontroversial. Consider an example used by both H L
A Hart and Lon Fuller in their well-known debate, published in the
Harvard Law Review of 1958.7 The example is that of a rule forbidding one
to drive a vehicle in a park. Assume, as Fuller does, that the purpose of
this rule is to prevent either noisy or dangerous activities from taking
7 H LAHart ‘Positivism and the separation of law and morals’ 71 (1958) Harvard LR 593;
Lon L Fuller ‘Positivism and fidelity to law – A reply to Professor Hart’ 71 (1958) Harvard LR
630.
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place in the park.8 Finally, imagine a park keeper burdened with the task
of deciding which activities to prohibit and which to permit.
There are two ways that the park keeper could use the rule in order to
justify a decision to prohibit a particular activity. One is to argue as
follows:
(a) The rule prohibits the driving of vehicles in the park.
(b) In performing the activity in question, one is driving a vehicle in the
park.
(c) Thus, the activity in question is prohibited by the rule.
As Hart points out, it will at times be possible to establish (b), ie, that
performing the activity in question is driving a vehicle, simply by relying
on the ordinary (or conventional) meaning of the phrase ‘driving a
vehicle in the park’.9 However, as Hart also points out, that will not
always be the case. Frequently, one will be able to establish (b), ie, that
performing an activity is driving a vehicle, only by relying on further
premises.10 One of those further premises, and it is a further premise that
is particularly emphasised by Fuller, is the rule’s purpose.11 For example,
ordinary meaning will probably not enable one to answer the question
whether a motorised skateboard is a vehicle. However, given that the
purpose of the rule prohibiting vehicles is to prevent noisy or unsafe
activities, and that motorised skateboards are both noisy and unsafe, it
could be argued that, for the purpose of the rule, motorised skateboards
are (to be counted as) vehicles.
I will call the form of reasoning that I have just described ‘concretisa-
tion’. Concretisation comes into play when the ordinary (or conven-
tional) meaning of a rule fails us. That is, it comes into play when, in
order to apply a rule, we have to rely on further premises, such as the
rule’s purpose. However, that does not mean that the ordinary meaning
of a rule does not have a role in its concretisation. On the contrary, it is an
essential feature of concretisation that ordinary meaning imposes the
following twofold constraint. First, it limits the purposes that can be
attributed to the rule. Thus, for example, it would be absurd to ascribe to
the no-vehicles rule the aim of promoting (rather than preventing) noisy
and dangerous activities. Secondly, it limits what can be done in pursuit
of those purposes. Thus, for example, holding a ‘rave’ in the park
certainly will be noisy. It probably will also be unsafe. Yet one could not
hope to justify a prohibition on raves in the park by concretisation of the
no-vehicles rule. For concretisation of the no-vehicles rule could only
8 Fuller (n 7) 663.
9 Hart (n 7) 607.
10 Ibid 607–8.
11 Fuller (n 7) 661–9.
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justify the prohibition of things that could plausibly be counted as
vehicles. Whatever else they may be, raves are not vehicles.
There is a second way in which the park keeper could use the
no-vehicles rule in order to justify the prohibition of a particular activity.
It goes like this:
(a) The rule prohibits the driving of vehicles in the park.
(b) In performing the activity in question, one is doing something very
like driving a vehicle.
(c) Thus, the activity in question should be prohibited.
The above form of reasoning, usually called ‘analogical reasoning’, is well
established in the practice of law, and has been much analysed by legal
philosophers.12 Here I wish to make only two observations regarding it.
The first is to draw attention to the indispensable role of purpose in
analogical reasoning. This is most easily demonstrated by considering (b)
in the argument above. It is trite that all objects, all activities, are similar in
some respects but dissimilar in others. It follows that (b) cannot be
asserting bare similarity between the activity in question and the activity
proscribed by the rule, namely driving a vehicle. Rather, (b) must be
asserting that the activity in question and the activity proscribed by the
rule are similar in a particularly important or relevant respect. But what is
to serve as the criterion, or test, of importance here? The answer is, of
course, that the criterion is provided by the purpose (or rationale) of the
rule. The role of purpose in analogical reasoning explains why the park
keeper can, by analogical reasoning, justify banning raves but not nude
sunbathing. The purpose of the no-vehicles rule, we said earlier, is to
prohibit noisy or unsafe activities. Given this purpose, raves are indeed
like vehicles: like vehicles, raves are both noisy and unsafe. However,
relative to this purpose, nude sunbathing bears no resemblance to driving
vehicles: one can do it in complete silence and with no threat of harm to
others.
My second observation has to do with the role of ordinary (or
conventional) meaning in analogical reasoning. As we saw earlier, the
ordinary meaning of a rule imposes a dual constraint on its concretisation.
It limits the purposes that can be attributed to the rule, and it limits what
can be done in pursuit of those purposes. The ordinary meaning of a rule
also has a role in the case of analogical reasoning. But the role is a lesser
one. As in the case of a rule’s concretisation, so too in the case of
analogical reasoning from a rule, the rule’s ordinary meaning imposes
limits on the purposes that can be attributed to the rule. That explains
12 For examples of such analysis, see Joseph Raz The Authority of Law (1979) 201–6; Cass R
Sunstein Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996) 62–100; Larry Alexander Legal Rules and
Legal Reasoning (2000) 179–227.
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why the park keeper cannot, by analogical reasoning, justify a prohibition
on nude sunbathing. However, unlike in the case of a rule’s concretisa-
tion, in the case of analogical reasoning from a rule, the rule’s ordinary
meaning places no limits on the means by which those purposes can be
pursued. That is why the park keeper can, by analogical reasoning, justify
a prohibition on raves.
III SECTION 39(2)
My aim in this section is to show that s 39(2) of the South African
Constitution requires SouthAfrican private common law (ie judge-made
law regulating relations between private parties) to be developed by
analogical reasoning from the Bill of Rights. Let me straight away
concede that this reading of s 39(2) is not compelled by the ordinary
meaning of the section. Section 39(2) says only that the common law is to
be developed so as to promote the purpose(s) of the Bill of Rights. As we
saw in the previous section of this essay, one can promote the purpose of
a rule not only by analogical reasoning from, but also by concretisation
of, the rule. One would therefore do no violence to the language of
s 39(2) if one were to reject my reading of the section, and insist instead
that it requires only that South African common law be developed by
concretisation of the Bill of Rights. However, as I demonstrate below,
though s 39(2) on its own does not compel my view as to what it
requires, a contextual reading of the section does compel it. Once s 39(2)
is viewed in the context of the Constitution as a whole (in particular s 8
thereof) and of the interim Constitution that preceded it (in particular
s 35(3) thereof),13 the view that it requires private common law to be
developed by analogical reasoning from the Bill of Rights becomes hard
to resist.
Let me start with s 35(3) of the interim Constitution, and with a claim
about it that should be uncontentious. It is that s 35(3) requires only that
private common law be developed by analogical reasoning from, and not
that it be developed by concretisation of, the Bill of Rights. The
substantiation for this claim is as follows:
(a) Section 35(3) requires that the development of private common law
be, in some way or other, influenced by the ‘spirit, purport and
objects’ of the interim Constitution’s Bill of Rights.
(b) Private common law consists of rights against private parties rather
than rights against the state. That is true by definition.
(c) The interim Constitution’s Bill of Rights consists of rights against
the state rather than rights against private parties. That was
13 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.
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established by the Constitutional Court in the case ofDu Plessis v De
Klerk.14
(d) Both concretisation of, and analogical reasoning from, the interim
Constitution’s Bill of Rights would take account of its ‘spirit,
purport and objects’. That is entailed by the explanation in the
previous section of this essay.
(e) However, since the interim Constitution’s Bill of Rights consists
only of rights against the state, its concretisation can only justify
further rights against the state. It cannot justify any rights against
private parties. Thus, concretisation of the interim Constitution’s
Bill of Rights cannot justify any development of private common
law.
(f) By contrast, notwithstanding that the interim Constitution’s Bill of
Rights consists only of rights against the state, analogical reasoning
from the Bill of Rights can justify rights against private parties. A
right against a private party could resemble, or be like, a right against
the state. For despite their obvious differences, chief among them
being the fact that one imposes duties only on the state and the other
only on private parties, they could have a common purpose, namely
to protect the identical interest(s) of the right-holder.
(g) Thus, s 35(3) must be understood to require that private common
law be developed by analogical reasoning from, rather than by
concretisation of, the interim Constitution’s Bill of Rights.
In the recent case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security, the South
African Constitutional Court stated that ‘there is no material difference
between s 35(3) of the IC [interim Constitution] and s 39(2) of the
[present] Constitution’.15 If the Court is right about that, and if I am right
about s 35(3), then I must also be right in claiming that s 39(2) of the
present Constitution requires private common law to be developed by
analogical reasoning. But is the Court right? Certainly, the wording of
the two sections is roughly the same. That creates a strong case for the
view that the sections have the same meaning. But it is not a conclusive
case. For the contexts within which the two sections appear are
dramatically different. As noted, the Bill of Rights in the interim
Constitution only contained rights against the state. The same is not true
of the present Constitution’s Bill of Rights. Section 8 of the present
Constitution unambiguously states that certain rights in the Bill of Rights
are rights also against private parties. Given these different contexts, it is
possible that s 39(2) differs in meaning from s 35(3), notwithstanding the
similarity in their wording. It is possible, in other words, that s 35(3)
14 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at 877B–E.
15 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 953I.
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requires private common law to be developed by analogical reasoning,
but that s 39(2) requires private common law to be developed in some
other way.
Further reflection on s 8, and its implications, shows that this
possibility does not in fact obtain. Indeed, further investigation shows
that, far from s 8 providing a reason against viewing s 39(2) as requiring
private common law to be developed by analogical reasoning from the
Bill of Rights, it provides a reason for so viewing it. Section 8 does not
only state that certain rights in the Bill of Rights are rights against private
parties. It also states that private common law must be developed ‘in
order to give effect to’ those rights.16 The only way that this could happen
is by concretisation of those rights. That is, s 8 in effect requires that
private common law be developed by concretisation of those rights in the
Bill of Rights that are rights against private parties. Of course, if s 8
requires private common law to be developed by concretisation of those
rights in the Bill of Rights that are rights against private parties, then
s 39(2) cannot be understood to require the same. That would render
s 39(2) superfluous. That raises the question: if s 39(2) does not require
private common law to be developed by concretisation of rights in the
Bill of Rights that are rights against private parties, what does it require?
It cannot require that private common law be developed by concretisa-
tion of rights in the Bill of Rights that are rights against the state. As we
have already shown, that is an impossibility. The only possibility that
remains is the one that I have suggested. Section 39(2) requires private
common law to be developed by analogical reasoning from the Bill of
Rights.
It is useful, I think, to distinguish two ways that private common law
might be developed by analogical reasoning from the Bill of Rights. One
is where the analogical reasoning proceeds from a right in the Bill of
Rights that is operative against the state only. A right of this kind cannot
of course influence the development of private common law by way of
concretisation. For concretisation of a right operative only against the
state cannot yield duties on private parties, and duties on private parties
are the essence of private common law. However, a right that holds only
against the state may influence the development of private common law
by way of analogical reasoning. For it might be that, even though the
right imposes duties only on the state, it serves a purpose that would also
justify the imposition of certain duties on private parties.
I should immediately caution against a possible confusion here. It
might be thought that, if a right serves a purpose that also justifies the
imposition of certain duties on private parties, then that right cannot truly
16 In s 8(3)(a).
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be a right operative only against the state. Instead, the right falls to be
identified as a right against private parties in terms of s 8(2). It is thus a
right that is to influence the development of private common law by
concretisation (in terms of s 8(3)(a)) rather than by analogical reasoning
(in terms of s 39(2)). This is false, however. It would have been true, had
the purpose underlying a right in the Bill of Rights been the sole
determinant of whether the right is operative only against the state or also
against private parties. But that is clearly not the case. The question
whether a right in the Bill of Rights holds against private parties as well as
the state depends also, and indeed primarily, on the constitutional text. It
depends on the wording of the clause that creates the right, and the
ordinary meaning of that wording. It is therefore quite possible for a
court to find, on the one hand, that a particular right in the Bill of Rights
operates only against the state (and not against private parties) and, on the
other, that the purpose of the right would be served by imposing a duty
on a private party.
The other way that private common law might be developed by
analogical reasoning from the Bill of Rights is by analogical reasoning
from a right in the Bill of Rights that is operative both against the state
and against private parties. A right of this kind can of course influence the
development of private common law by way of concretisation. But that
does not preclude it from influencing the development of private
common law also by way of analogical reasoning. Assume that the right
to freedom of expression in s 16 operates both against the state and
against private parties. A court may impose certain duties on private
parties on the ground that the duties are required to protect others’
freedom of expression – in that case the court is proceeding by
concretising the right. A court may however impose certain duties on
private parties solely on the ground that the duties serve the purpose of
the right to freedom of expression (regardless of whether the duties serve
the right itself) – in that event, the court is proceeding by analogical
reasoning from the right.
IV NEITHER JUSTICE NOR FAIRNESS
In this section I show that, because s 39(2) requires private common law
to be developed by analogical reasoning from the Bill of Rights rather
than by concretisation thereof, it cannot be justified by either justice or
fairness. To show this, I employ an example drawn from ordinary life.
The example is not mine: Dworkin uses it to good effect in Chapter 5 of
his book, Life’s Dominion.17
17 Ronald Dworkin Life’s Dominion (1994) 134.
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Say a friend asks me to go out and buy her a healthy lunch.Assume, as I
think one must, that my friend’s request reflects a judgement on her part
that satisfaction of the request will serve her goals (or some of them). Say
further that in response to the request I go out and purchase a chicken
salad, in the belief that that is a healthy lunch. Moreover, say that I
reached this belief by considering several premises not provided by the
request alone: premises about the criteria for health and their satisfaction
by the chicken salad. It seems to me that my action here is best described
by saying that I have gone beyond my friend’s judgement, but have done
so only in order to give effect to it. It also seems to me that, if a chicken
salad really is a healthy lunch, I have in fact succeeded in giving effect to
my friend’s judgement. It follows that, provided that a chicken salad
really is a healthy lunch, I can justify my action (the purchasing of the
chicken salad) by appealing to my friend’s judgement.
Imagine now a somewhat different response. Instead of (or as well as)
purchasing a chicken salad, I buy my friend a book on healthy living.
Moreover, I do so for the following reasons. One: underlying my friend’s
request that I buy her a healthy lunch is a concern on her part to satisfy
her goals (or some of them). Two: reading a book on healthy living will
satisfy those goals: in fact, it will better satisfy those goals than will a
chicken salad. Now, my friend may be very pleased to receive the book.
But if she is not, I could hardly hope to placate her by saying: ‘But I was
only carrying out your request. I was only giving effect to your
judgement.’ The judgement that is reflected in her request is the
judgement that a healthy lunch will satisfy her goals. It is not merely a
judgement about what her goals are, but also a judgement about how
those goals are to be pursued. Far from giving effect to this judgement, I
have in fact bypassed it.
The above example shows that s 39(2) cannot have the same
justification as s 8. My friend’s request reflects a judgement on her part as
to how her goals are to be pursued. Similarly, the rights in a bill of rights
(be they rights against private parties or the state) represent a judgement
by the constitution-makers as to how certain fundamental values or goals
are to be achieved. When a judge develops private common law in terms
of s 8, his action is comparable to the first of the responses that were
described above. Section 8, as we have seen, requires a judge to develop
private common law by concretising certain rights in the Bill of Rights.
What am I doing when I purchase the chicken salad, if not concretising
my friend’s request for a healthy lunch? It follows that, just as I can justify
my purchasing decision by appealing to my friend’s judgement, so too a
judge who develops private common law in terms of s 8 can justify his
decisions by invoking the judgement of the constitution-makers. He can
claim to have given effect to the constitution-makers’ judgement, even
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though (and in fact by) exceeding it. When a judge develops private
common law in terms of s 39(2), there is no possibility of a similar appeal
to the constitution-makers’ judgement. When private common law is
developed in terms of s 39(2), we have an action comparable to the
second of the responses described above. As was explained earlier, the
development of private common law in terms of s 39(2) proceeds by
analogical reasoning. So does my second response. This means that, in
the same way that my second response exceeds my friend’s judgement
without giving it effect, so the development of private common law in
terms of s 39(2) exceeds the constitution-makers’ judgement without
giving that effect.
The fact that development of private common law in terms of s 8, but
not s 39(2), gives effect to the constitution-makers’ judgement means that
s 8, but not s 39(2), can be justified on the ground of justice. It is of
course possible that judges develop private common law according to
their own moral judgement. Indeed, for most of its life, South African
private common law was developed in precisely that fashion.18 It follows
that s 8 and s 39(2) are justified only if it is (in some way) better that
private common law be developed as they require, than that it be
developed in accordance with judges’ own moral views. It certainly is
better, if private common law developed in terms of these sections is
likely to be more just (or more likely to be just) than private common law
developed by judges following their own moral lights.19 But what could
make that so? There is only one possibility. It is that, when judges
develop private common law in accordance with the requirements of s 8
and s 39(2), they give effect to a moral judgement, a judgement about
justice, superior to their own.20 For that to be the case, it is necessary (at
the very least) that judges do actually give effect to someone else’s moral
judgement when they develop private common law in accordance with
s 8 and s 39(2). As we saw above, this condition is met in the case of s 8.
When judges develop private common law in terms of s 8, they give
effect to the judgement of the constitution-makers. However, as we also
saw above, the condition is not met in the case of s 39(2). When judges
develop private common law in terms of s 39(2), they do not give effect
to the constitution-makers’ judgement. Nor do they give effect to the
judgement of anyone else.
So, justice may provide a justification for s 8, but it does not provide a
justification for s 39(2). What about fairness? Once again the fact that s 8,
18 The South African Constitutional Court more or less acknowledges this in the Carmichele
case (n 15) 954C–D.
19 I am relying here on Joseph Raz’s explanation of authority, in particular his ‘normal
justification thesis’. See Joseph Raz Ethics in the Public Domain (1994) 211–15.
20 See Joseph Raz ‘Intention in interpretation’ in Robert P. George (ed) The Autonomy of
Law (1996) 258–9.
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but not s 39(2), gives effect to the constitution-makers’ judgement is of
critical importance. Fairness, as Dworkin describes it, concerns the
distribution of political power.21 One could put it another way: fairness is
about whose judgement should count, and how much. That should
make it obvious that, if s 8 and s 39(2) are to be defended on the basis of
fairness, it must be because they cause private common law to be
developed (wholly or in part) in accordance with the judgement of
persons other than judges. However, as we have seen, while s 8 achieves
this, s 39(2) does not. It follows that, while fairness can serve as
justification for s 8, it cannot serve as justification for s 39(2).
To avoid confusion I should emphasise that, in speaking of ‘the
constitution-makers’ judgement’ in this section, I meant to refer only to
the judgement that the constitution-makers exercised in creating the
rights comprising the Bill of Rights. I did not mean to refer to the
judgement that the constitution-makers exercised in creating s 39(2). My
concern in this section was the justification of s 39(2). One cannot hope
to justify s 39(2) on the ground that, in so far as judges follow s 39(2) (by
developing private common law by analogical reasoning from the Bill of
Rights), they give effect to the judgement that the constitution-makers
exercised in creating s 39(2). That would amount to saying that s 39(2) is
justified simply because the constitution-makers judged it to be so.
V ANALOGICAL REASONING IN THE SERVICE OF
POLITICAL INTEGRITY
In this essay so far, I have explained the difference between concretisation
of, and analogical reasoning from, a rule. I have shown that s 39(2) of
the South African Constitution requires the latter. And I have demon-
strated that, because of that, s 39(2) cannot be justified by either justice
or fairness. In Law’s Empire, Dworkin argues that, besides justice and
fairness, there exists a third political virtue that he calls political integrity.
Can political integrity succeed where justice and fairness have failed? Can
political integrity justify s 39(2)? For it to do so, two conditions must
hold. First, s 39(2) must actually promote political integrity. Secondly,
political integrity must really be a virtue. This essay deals with the first of
these conditions.
There certainly are grounds for believing that s 39(2) promotes
political integrity. Dworkin has for many years been a champion of
analogical reasoning in law. Moreover, Dworkin’s main reason for
championing analogical reasoning in law is that it promotes political
integrity. As has been explained, s 39(2) requires that private common
law be developed by analogical reasoning. If political integrity is served
21 Dworkin (n 2) 164.
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by analogical reasoning in law and analogical reasoning in law is required
by s 39(2), does it not necessarily follow that s 39(2) serves political
integrity?
I am not the first to recognise Dworkin’s commitment to analogical
reasoning in the law. Joseph Raz has commented that ‘Professor
Dworkin’s theory of adjudication is the most extreme case of total faith in
analogical arguments’.22 Larry Alexander makes a similar observation:
‘Surely, Dworkin’s domain is ARIL’s [ie analogical reasoning in law’s]
natural home. Indeed, ARIL is the methodology that has secured
Dworkin his empire in the law. Although Dworkin did not create ARIL,
he took ARIL and harnessed it to his cause.’23
Dworkin’s enthusiasm for analogical reasoning in law is already
apparent in his ‘Hard Cases’.24 There he argues that statutes and
precedents have not only what he calls ‘enactment force’ but also what he
calls ‘gravitational force’.25 Expressed in the terminology that I have used
in this essay, the enactment force of a statute or precedent is its ability to
justify decisions by way of its concretisation. A statute or precedent’s
gravitational force, by contrast, is its ability to justify decisions by
analogical reasoning from it. Using the terminology of this essay, the
theory of adjudication that Dworkin proposes in ‘Hard Cases’ can thus be
summarised by the following six propositions:
(a) A judicial decision may be justified because it concretises a statute or
a precedent. (As Dworkin puts it, both statutes and precedents have
‘enactment force’.26)
(b) A judicial decision may also, however, be justified because it is
produced by analogical reasoning from the entire set of statutes and
precedents. (Statutes and precedents have not only enactment force
but also ‘gravitational force’.27)
(c) For a decision to be justified by analogical reasoning from the entire
set of statutes and precedents, it is necessary and sufficient that it
serve the same purpose(s) as is (are) served by the bulk of the statutes
and precedents. (Statutes or precedents that do not serve the same
purpose(s) as is (are) served by the bulk of the statutes and precedents
Dworkin calls ‘mistakes’. According to Dworkin, mistakes have no
gravitational force. That is, a judicial decision cannot be justified by
showing that it serves the same purpose as a mistake; nor does a
22 Raz (n 12) 205.
23 Alexander (n 12) 206.
24 Reprinted in Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1977).
25 Ibid 111–12.
26 Ibid 107–9, 111.
27 Ibid 111–12, 116–17, 121–2.
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judicial decision lack justification because it frustrates the purpose of
a mistake.28)
(d) Adecision justified by concretisation of a statute or a precedent may
conflict with a decision justified by analogical reasoning from the
entire set of statutes and precedents. (This will happen where the
statute or precedent being concretised is a mistake.)
(e) A decision justified by concretisation of a statute or a binding
precedent takes priority over a conflicting decision justified by
analogical reasoning from the entire set of statutes or precedents. (As
Dworkin would put it: an ‘embedded mistake’ preserves its
enactment force.29)
(f) However, a decision justified by concretisation of a non-binding
precedent may be overridden by a decision justified by analogical
reasoning from the entire set of statutes or precedents. (Ie, a
‘corrigible mistake’ loses its enactment force.30)
In Law’s Empire Dworkin again emphasises the importance of analogical
reasoning in law. The metaphor has changed: whereas ‘Hard Cases’
speaks of ‘gravitational force’, Law’s Empire speaks of ‘the chain of law’.31
But the basic point remains the same: a judicial decision may be justified
on the ground that it serves the purpose(s) served by the bulk of a
community’s statutes and precedents.32 Of course, while ‘Hard Cases’
accords analogical reasoning an important role in adjudication, the role is
nonetheless a limited one. As explained above, a decision justified by
concretisation of a statute or a binding precedent takes priority over a
conflicting decision justified by analogical reasoning from the entire set
of statutes or precedents (this was proposition (e)). It follows that judges
are to resort to analogical reasoning in two circumstances only. One is
where concretisation of statutes and binding precedents leaves a so-called
‘gap’: ie, it provides no solution to the case at hand. The other is where
concretisation of a non-binding precedent yields a decision contrary to
the decision yielded by analogical reasoning: here analogical reasoning
justifies overruling the precedent (this was proposition (f)). Law’s Empire,
it may be said, abandons these constraints on analogical reasoning. Law’s
Empire, it may be said, advances an approach to adjudication that is all
analogical reasoning and no concretisation. I concede that much of Law’s
Empire, and especially chapter seven thereof, creates that impression.
However, the impression can be maintained only as long as one does not




31 Dworkin (n 2) 228, 238–9, 313.
32 Ibid 225–58.
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it clear that adjudication is to be governed by what he calls ‘inclusive
integrity’, rather than by what he calls ‘pure integrity’.33 Pure integrity
requires judges always to make the decisions that are justified by
analogical reasoning. Inclusive integrity, by contrast, requires judges to
make decisions that concretise (or give effect to) statutes and (binding)
precedents, even when those decisions are in conflict with the decisions
justified by analogical reasoning.34
As was explained in section II of this essay, in order to make a decision
by analogical reasoning from a rule one must attribute a purpose to the
rule. Dworkin has written a great deal about the way that purpose is to be
attributed to statutes and precedents. His main claim in this regard has
however remained more or less unchanged over the years: an attribution
of purpose to a set of statutes and precedents is sound in so far as it ‘fits’
and ‘justifies’ them. A purpose fits a set of statutes and precedents to
which it has been ascribed in so far as someone pursuing that purpose
could have created the statutes and precedents.35 A purpose justifies a set
of statutes and precedents to which it has been ascribed in so far as it
shows them to have moral value.36 The claim that attributions of purpose
to statutes and precedents are to be judged against these two dimensions,
ie, fit and justification, is vintage Dworkin. It makes its appearance in
embryonic form in ‘The Model of Rules II’37 and appears almost
fully-grown in ‘Hard Cases’. Law’s Empire introduces only two important
developments. One is to clarify the relationship between fit and
justification.38 The other is to connect the claim that attributions of
purpose to statutes and precedents must fit and justify them to a general
theory of interpretation.39
Although, as I have explained, Law’s Empire introduces no significant
changes in Dworkin’s account of how adjudication is to proceed, it does
introduce a significant development as regards his justification of that
account. In ‘Hard Cases’Dworkin makes only the suggestive remark that
‘[t]he gravitational force of a precedent may be explained by appeal . . . to
33 Ibid 405.
34 Ibid. For further confirmation that Dworkin continues to accord an important role to
concretisation in his account of adjudication, see his writing on constitutional adjudication.
35 Ibid 230, 240, 242.
36 Ibid 248–9, 256.
37 Reprinted in Dworkin (n 24) 66–8.
38 In his ‘Reply to Critics’ (in Dworkin (n 24) 340–2), Dworkin had seemed to suggest that
fit operated only as a threshold requirement. A purpose could be attributed to a set of statutes
and precedents only if it achieved a certain degree of fit. However, among the purposes that
met the threshold, the choice was to be made purely on the basis of justification. In Dworkin (n
2) (246–7, 255–7), he seems to say that fit provides more than merely a threshold. The choice
among the purposes that achieve the required degree of fit is to be made by weighing fit against
justification.
39 Dworkin (n 2) 52, 225.
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the fairness of treating like cases alike’.40 In Law’s Empire this has matured
into the idea that, in so far as judges make decisions justified by analogical
reasoning from the entire set of statutes and precedents, they serve a
distinct political ideal, an ideal beside justice and fairness, namely political
integrity.41
In Law’s Empire Dworkin devotes one and a half chapters to an
explanation of political integrity’s nature and value.42 He devotes an
entire chapter to an explanation of how analogical reasoning in law
should proceed.43 But he makes no attempt at all to explain just how
political integrity is served by analogical reasoning from the full set of
statutes and precedents. The omission is not an important one, however.
It obviously is so that, if one adds rules to a set by way of analogical
reasoning from the set, the expanded set will possess equal or greater
political integrity than the original. To see this, consider a set of rules: A,
B, C and D. Assume that B, C and D are consistent in principle, but A is
not. If rule E is added to the set by way of analogical reasoning from the
set, then E will be consistent in principle with B, C and D. Thus, a set in
which 75% of the rules (B, C and D, but notA) are consistent in principle
will have been changed into a set in which 80% of the rules (B, C, D and
E, but not A) are consistent in principle. Since a set of rules possesses
political integrity in so far as the rules are consistent in principle,
analogical reasoning has produced an increase in political integrity of 5%.
VI POLITICAL INTEGRITY AND VERTICAL ORDERING
In the previous section I explained the role that analogical reasoning has
in Dworkin’s account of adjudication. I also explained that, given that
role, analogical reasoning does serve political integrity. If new precedents
are added to a set of statutes and precedents by way of analogical
reasoning from the set, the expanded set of statutes and precedents will
possess equal or greater political integrity than the original. Section 39(2),
as we saw earlier in this essay, requires that South African private
common law be developed by analogical reasoning from the South
African Bill of Rights. Does it not follow, then, that s 39(2) must
necessarily promote the political integrity of South African law? Does it
not follow, then, that I can show s 39(2) to be lacking in justification only
by showing that political integrity is not the virtue that Dworkin claims it
is?
No, it does not follow. Consider what happens when rule F is added to
A, B, C and D, on the basis of analogical reasoning from A, a rule that is
40 Dworkin (n 24) 113.
41 Dworkin (n 2) 243, 257, 262, 263, 404, and 411.
42 Chapters 5 and 6.
43 Chapter 7.
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inconsistent in principle with the rest. F will be consistent in principle
with A, but not with B, C and D. Thus, a set in which 75% of the rules
(B, C and D, but not A) are consistent in principle will have been
changed into a set in which 60% of the rules (B, C and D, but not A and
F) are consistent in principle. Because analogical reasoning here
proceeded from a rule that was inconsistent in principle with the bulk of
the rules, it produced a decrease in political integrity of 15%. As was
explained in the previous section, Dworkin calls a legal rule that is
inconsistent in principle with (ie, that does not serve the same purpose(s)
as) the bulk of a community’s legal rules a ‘mistake’. Expressed in
Dworkin’s terminology, the point demonstrated is thus this: analogical
reasoning from a mistake diminishes rather than promotes political
integrity.
This suggests that whether s 39(2) promotes the political integrity of
South African law depends, crucially, on whether the South African Bill
of Rights is or is not consistent in principle with the bulk of South
African law. It depends, that is, on whether the Bill of Rights is or is not a
‘mistake’, in the sense that Dworkin uses the word. If it is inconsistent in
principle, if it is a mistake, then developing private common law by
analogical reasoning from it, as s 39(2) requires, will diminish rather than
promote the political integrity of South African law. It will do so in the
same way that proceeding fromA by analogical reasoning yielded a set of
rules (A, B, C, D and F) that had less political integrity than the original
set (A, B, C and D).
The following objection might be raised to the preceding argument.
‘It is quite true that, if A is inconsistent in principle with B, C and D, and
F is established by analogical reasoning fromA, thenA, B, C, D and F will
have less political integrity than A, B, C and D. However, it does not
follow that, if the South African Bill of Rights is inconsistent in principle
with the remainder of South African law, and a new precedent is
established by analogical reasoning from the Bill of Rights, then the
political integrity of South African law will be compromised. For there is
a critical difference between A, B, C and D, on the one hand, and the
South African Bill of Rights and South African law, on the other. A has
the same status as B, C and D: all four rules are ‘on a level’. The South
African Bill of Rights, by contrast, is ‘fundamental’. It is of a higher order
– it has greater authority – than the rest of South African law. Analogical
reasoning from a rule that is of a higher order, or has greater authority,
than the rest of the rules in a set promotes the political integrity of that
set, even if the rule (from which the analogical reasoning proceeds) is
inconsistent in principle with the rest. Thus, where A has greater
authority than B, C and D, and F is established by analogical reasoning
fromA, the set A, B, C, D and F has greater political integrity than the set
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A, B, C and D, even if A is inconsistent in principle with B, C and D.
Thus also, given that the South African Bill of Rights has ultimate
authority in South African law, analogical reasoning from the Bill of
Rights will promote the political integrity of South African law, even if
the Bill of Rights is inconsistent in principle with the rest of South
African law. It follows that, contrary to what was asserted above, s 39(2)
promotes the political integrity of South African law regardless of
whether or not the Bill of Rights is inconsistent in principle with the
remainder of South African law.’
The objection stands or falls by the following proposition: the political
integrity of a set of rules is promoted by analogical reasoning from a rule
in the set with greater authority than the rest even if the former is
inconsistent in principle with the latter. Does Dworkin endorse this
proposition? He certainly has never done so explicitly. Has he done so by
implication?
In ‘Hard Cases’ Dworkin appears to endorse a closely related
proposition, namely that analogical reasoning is justified when it
proceeds from a rule that has greater authority than others, even if the
rule is inconsistent in principle with them. For, in ‘Hard Cases’, Dworkin
argues that analogical reasoning from a set of legal rules must take account
of any ‘vertical ordering’ within the set.44 In other words, it must take
account of ‘layers of authority; that is, layers at which official decisions
might be taken to be controlling over decisions made at lower levels’.45
The way that analogical reasoning is to take account of vertical ordering
is by prioritising the purposes attributable to rules higher in the hierarchy
over purposes attributable to rules lower down.46 Thus, where a purpose
attributable to a rule at the top of the hierarchy is at odds with a purpose
attributable to the rules at the bottom, analogical reasoning is to pursue
the former in preference to the latter.
The proposition that Dworkin endorses in ‘Hard Cases’ does not entail
the proposition that the objection relies upon. It could be true that
analogical reasoning is justified if it proceeds from a rule that has greater
authority than the other rules in a set (even though it is inconsistent in
principle with them), yet be false that analogical reasoning under such
conditions promotes political integrity. For it could be that analogical
reasoning in such circumstances is justified for reasons other than that it
promotes political integrity. Indeed, in ‘Hard Cases’ Dworkin could not
have had political integrity in mind as a justification. For at the time that
‘Hard Cases’ appeared Dworkin had not yet identified political integrity
as a political virtue.
44 Dworkin (n 24) 117.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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So ‘Hard Cases’ contains neither an explicit nor an implied endorse-
ment of the proposition that the objection relies upon. But what about
Law’s Empire? Political integrity is one of the centrepieces of Law’s Empire.
Moreover, in Law’s Empire Dworkin makes it clear that political integrity
provides the justification for analogical reasoning in law. However,
nowhere in Law’s Empire does one find anything resembling the claim in
‘Hard Cases’ that analogical reasoning must take account of vertical
ordering. More than that, in Law’s EmpireDworkin argues that analogical
reasoning should take account of ‘local priority’.47 Whereas analogical
reasoning that takes account of vertical ordering is top-down, analogical
reasoning that takes account of local priority seems to be bottom-up.
Whereas the former prioritises the purposes of rules at the top of a
hierarchy, the latter seems to prioritise the purposes of the rules at the
bottom.
It is thus uncertain whether Dworkin supports the objector’s proposi-
tion, ie, the proposition that the political integrity of a set of rules is
promoted by analogical reasoning that proceeds from a rule that has
greater authority than, but is inconsistent with, the rest. Should Dworkin
support the objector’s proposition? Is the objector’s proposition sound? I
believe not.
The objector’s proposition contains a notion that has hitherto been left
unanalysed. It is that of a rule having ‘ultimate authority’ within (or
‘greater authority’ than the rest of) a set of rules. How exactly is the
notion of ‘ultimate ‘authority’ to be understood? One possibility is that,
in saying that a rule has ultimate authority within a set, one is saying
something about the rule’s gravitational force. That is, one is saying
something about the strength of the justification that analogical reasoning
from the rule provides. One might be claiming that analogical reasoning
from the rule provides a stronger justification for the addition of new
rules to the set than does analogical reasoning from, and/or concretisa-
tion of, the other rules in the set. One might also be claiming that
analogical reasoning from the rule sometimes justifies the extinction of
other rules in the set. It seems to me that the objector cannot define the
notion of ‘ultimate authority’ in this way if he also wishes to justify s 39(2)
on the basis that it promotes the political integrity of SouthAfrican law. If
‘ultimate authority’ is so defined, the South African Bill of Rights does of
course have it. It has it by virtue of s 39(2). But then it follows that to
claim, as the objector does, that s 39(2) promotes the political integrity of
SouthAfrican law because the Bill of Rights has ‘ultimate authority’, is to
claim that s 39(2) promotes the political integrity of South African law
because s 39(2) exists. Were the objector then to go on and claim that
47 Dworkin (n 2) 250–4, 402.
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s 39(2) is justified because it promotes the political integrity of South
African law, he would in effect be claiming that s 39(2) is justified because
it exists. That obviously is absurd.
There is however another possibility. In saying that a rule has ultimate
authority within a set one might be saying something about the rule’s
enactment (rather than gravitational) force. That is, one might be saying
something about the strength of the justification that is provided by the
rule’s concretisation (rather than by analogical reasoning from the rule).
One might be claiming that concretisation of the rule provides a stronger
justification for the addition of new rules to the set than does analogical
reasoning from, and/or concretisation of, the other rules in the set. One
might also be claiming that concretisation of the rule sometimes justifies
the extinction of other rules in the set.
Can the objector define ‘ultimate authority’ in this second way and still
defend s 39(2) on the ground that it promotes the political integrity of
South African law? The Bill of Rights has ultimate authority, also if
ultimate authority is defined in this manner. It has it, however, not by
virtue of s 39(2) but rather by virtue of s 8. For it is s 8, and not s 39(2),
that deals with the enactment force of the Bill of Rights, that is, with the
ability of the Bill of Rights to justify, through its concretisation, the
development and modification of the rest of SouthAfrican law. It follows
that, if ‘ultimate authority’ is defined in this manner, the objector’s claim
that s 39(2) promotes the political integrity of South African law because
the Bill of Rights has ultimate authority, amounts to the claim that s 39(2)
promotes the political integrity of South African law by virtue of s 8.
Now combine that with the further claim that s 39(2) is justified because
it promotes the political integrity of South African law. The result is that
the justification of s 39(2) is made to depend upon the existence of s 8.
This is a problematic outcome for the objector. The objector offers a
response to my claim that s 39(2) promotes the political integrity of
SouthAfrican law only if the Bill of Rights is not a mistake, that is, only if
the Bill of Rights is not inconsistent in principle with the bulk of South
African law. The response is that s 39(2) promotes the political integrity
of South African law regardless of whether or not the Bill of Rights is
consistent in principle with the bulk of South African law, because the
Bill of Rights has ultimate authority within SouthAfrican law.According
to the objector, in other words, s 39(2) promotes the political integrity of
South African law because the way that the political integrity of South
African law is to be promoted is sensitive to a particular ranking of legal
rules (or legal sources) in South African law. That ranking, it now turns
out, is determined by s 8.As was explained earlier, s 8 ranks SouthAfrica’s
legal rules or sources for the purpose of concretisation. As was also
explained earlier, the justification for concretisation is justice and fairness.
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If the ranking created by s 8 is defensible, therefore, it must be on the
basis that it serves one or both of these virtues. That creates a puzzle
which, I suspect, the objector might find difficult to solve. Given that
political integrity is, as Dworkin emphasises, ‘a distinct political virtue
beside justice and fairness’,48 why should the way that the political
integrity of a community’s law is to be promoted be sensitive to a ranking
of legal rules the justification whereof is that it serves justice and fairness?
VII CONCLUSION
The previous section established that s 39(2) promotes the political
integrity of South African law only if the South African Bill of Rights is
consistent in principle with the bulk of South African law. Is the Bill of
Rights consistent in principle with the bulk of South African law or is it
rather a mistake?
On this question, South African judicial opinion seems to be divided.
In the case of Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd Cameron J (now JA)
tended towards the view that the Bill of Rights is inconsistent in principle
with the bulk of South African law.49 In the judgment, Cameron J wrote
of ‘the revolution the Constitution has wrought in our legal fabric’,50 and
claimed that whereas our legal system previously ‘did not treasure at its
core a democratic ideal’,51 ‘the Constitution plants new values at the
roots of our legal system’.52 However, in the case of National Media Ltd
and others v Bogoshi Hefer JA appeared to lean towards the opposite
view.53 In this case, as is well known, Hefer JA changed the SouthAfrican
law of defamation so that it now accords significantly greater protection
to freedom of expression. However, Hefer JA did so on the basis that the
values of the common law, conformably with the values of the Bill of
Rights, required the change. Moreover, in justifying the change, Hefer
JA in terms says: ‘[I]t makes no difference that South Africa has only
recently acquired the status of a truly democratic country. Freedom of
expression, albeit not entrenched, did exist in the society that we knew at
the time when Pakendorf was decided.’54
I do not intend to express a view in this essay as to whether the South
African Bill of Rights is or is not consistent in principle with the bulk of
South African law. Instead, I wish to conclude this essay by drawing
attention to a dilemma that seems to be created by the analysis of s 39(2)
that has been presented in this essay. According to that analysis, s 39(2)
48 Dworkin (n 2) 166.




53 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA).
54 At 1210F.
136 THE PRACTICE OF INTEGRITY
cannot be justified by an appeal to justice or fairness, but might be
justified on the ground that it promotes the political integrity of South
African law. Assume, then, that Cameron J is correct: the Bill of Rights is
inconsistent in principle with the bulk of South African law. In that
event, as has been shown, s 39(2) does not promote the political integrity
of South African law. Assume, contrariwise, that Hefer JA is correct: the
Bill of Rights is consistent in principle with the bulk of South African
law. In that event, s 39(2) is surely redundant. This is in fact demonstrated
by the Bogoshi judgment.
In the end, s 39(2) appears to be caught between Scylla and Charybdis.
For s 39(2) to promote the integrity of South African law, the Bill of
Rights must be consistent in principle with the bulk of SouthAfrican law.
But if the Bill of Rights is consistent in principle with the bulk of South
African law, then s 39(2) is superfluous. We are left with the conclusion
either that s 39(2) is justified but redundant, or that it makes a difference
but is lacking in justification.
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